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SYMPOSIUM
RISE OF THE MACHINES: ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE, ROBOTICS, AND THE
REPROGRAMMING OF LAW
FOREWORD
Deborah W. Denno* & Ryan Surujnath**
INTRODUCTION
This Foreword provides an overview of Rise of the Machines: Artificial
Intelligence, Robotics, and the Reprogramming of Law, a symposium hosted
by the Fordham Law Review and cosponsored by the Fordham Law School’s
Neuroscience and Law Center. As the Symposium spotlights, artificial

* Arthur A. McGivney Professor of Law, Founding Director, Neuroscience and Law Center,
Fordham University School of Law.
** Analyst, GSO Capital Partners, The Blackstone Group Inc.; J.D., 2018, Fordham
University School of Law. This Foreword discusses the Fordham Law Review Symposium
entitled Rise of the Machines: Artificial Intelligence, Robotics, and the Reprogramming of
Law (cosponsored with Fordham Law School’s Neuroscience and Law Center), held at
Fordham Law School. We are most grateful to the Symposium participants for their insightful
presentations and their superb articles published in this issue. We also thank the members of
the Fordham Law Review for their incredible care and thought in organizing the Symposium
and the editorial process, especially Andrew Kirschenbaum, Lauren Gorab, Sean O’Grady,
Lauren Knoke, and Jane Ramage. There are many invaluable behind-the-scenes individuals
who made this Symposium possible. They include Rick Turk, who offered wonderful advice
and encouragement, as well as Shanelle Holley, Morgan Benedit, Victoria Grantham, and
Robert Yasharian, all of whom expertly publicized the Symposium and managed many of the
details associated with it. Jacob Fishman and Erica Valencia-Graham provided outstanding
comments and research assistance for this Foreword. Finally, we truly appreciate Dean
Matthew Diller’s steadfast support and inspiration as well as the indispensable contributions
of the Neuroscience and Law Center’s Board of Advisors. We are indebted to six sources for
research funding: Fordham University School of Law, Fordham’s Neuroscience and Law
Center, Mr. and Mrs. John R. Costantino, the Gerald M. Edelman Post-Graduate Fellowship
in Neuroscience, Roger Sachs Family Foundation, and the Barnet and Sharon Phillips Family
Fund.
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intelligence1 (AI) and robotics2 are no longer the products of science fiction.
AI is used by millions of people every day, from hedge fund managers to
health-care professionals and even consumers of personalized assistants like
Siri, Cortana, and Alexa.3 Neuroscience—“the branch of life sciences that
studies the brain and nervous systems,”4—is integral to AI development, as
programmers seek to improve machines by understanding human thought
patterns.5
1. There is no uniform or generally approved definition of artificial intelligence. See
Ryan Calo, Artificial Intelligence Policy: A Primer and Roadmap, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
399, 404 (2017). Mainly, the term is regarded “as a set of techniques aimed at approximating
some aspect of human or animal cognition using machines.” Id.; see also Tabrez Y. Ebrahim,
Data-Centric Technologies: Patent and Copyright Doctrinal Disruptions, 43 NOVA L. REV.
287, 295 (2019) (defining artificial intelligence as “a program running on a computer system
that is able to learn and adapt itself in a dynamic environment”); Milan Markovic, Rise of the
Robot Lawyers?, 61 ARIZ. L. REV. 325, 329 (2019) (“Although definitions of artificial
intelligence vary, the term is generally associated with the automation of intelligent behavior
via computer processes.”). Stuart Russell and Peter Norvig stress the importance of an
“intelligent” agent, thereby viewing artificial intelligence “as the study of agents that receive
percepts from the environment and perform actions.” STUART RUSSELL & PETER NORVIG,
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A MODERN APPROACH, at viii (3d ed. 2010).
2. There is no consensus concerning how “robot” or “robotic” should be defined. See F.
Patrick Hubbard, “Sophisticated Robots”: Balancing Liability, Regulation, and Innovation,
66 FLA. L. REV. 1803, 1807 (2014). Indeed, the terms “robotic” and “artificial intelligence”
are frequently treated synonymously. See Mark A. Lemley & Bryan Casey, Remedies for
Robots, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 1311, 1321 (2019). That said, there is an overall view that “robots
are mechanical objects that take the world in, process what they sense, and in turn act upon
the world.” Ryan Calo, Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 513, 529–
30 (2015). This “sense-think-act paradigm” differentiates robots from other technical devices.
For example, while a laptop with a camera can “sense and process the external world” to a
certain extent, the laptop camera “does not act upon the world.” Id.; see also Robotics,
TECHOPEDIA,
https://www.techopedia.com/definition/32836/robotics
[https://perma.cc/
9VAQ-C2BU] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019) (Robotics refers to “the engineering, construction
and operation of robots” to perform tasks or play a role in various commercial and consumer
uses.); Robots and Robotic Devises—Vocabulary, INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION,
https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#iso:std:iso:8373:ed-2:v1:en
[https://perma.cc/BQ8C-WG5R]
(last visited Oct. 6, 2019) (defining “robotics” as the “science and practice of designing,
manufacturing, and applying robots”).
3. See Fei Jiang et al., Artificial Intelligence in Healthcare: Past, Present and Future, 2
STROKE & VASCULAR NEUROLOGY 230 (2017) (noting that AI is used by health-care
professionals); Erik Brynjolfsson & Andrew McAfee, The Business of Artificial Intelligence:
What It Can–and Cannot–Do for Your Organization, HARV. BUS. REV. (July 18, 2017),
https://hbr.org/cover-story/2017/07/the-business-of-artificial-intelligence [https://perma.cc/
Y2WY-YQPL] (noting that AI is used by millions of people every day); Hedge Funds
Embrace Machine Learning—Up to a Point, ECONOMIST (Dec. 9, 2017), https://
www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2017/12/09/hedge-funds-embrace-machinelearning-up-to-a-point [https://perma.cc/7GUY-7GXE] (noting that AI is used by hedge fund
managers); Rufin VanRullen, Perception Science in the Age of Deep Neural Networks,
FRONTIERS PSYCHOL. (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/
fpsyg.2017.00142/full [https://perma.cc/26KK-YN6W] (explaining that AI is used by
consumers of personalized assistants like Siri, Cortana, and Alexa).
4. NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW: BRAIN, MIND, AND THE SCALES OF JUSTICE 206 (Brent
Garland ed., 2004); see also OWEN D. JONES ET AL., LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE 762 (2014)
(defining neuroscience as “[t]he scientific study of the structure and function of the nervous
system; includes experimental and clinical studies of animals and humans”).
5. See generally Jacob T. Schwartz, The New Connectionism: Developing Relationships
Between Neuroscience and Artificial Intelligence, DAEDALUS, Winter 1988, at 123 (predicting,
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During the early stages of AI, neuroscience was integral to the
development of basic neural networks’ reinforcement learning. Today,
modern AI research has taken cues from neurological studies to replicate
human cognitive functions in an AI’s code. For example, one challenge
facing modern AI is continual learning, which is the ability to master a new
task without forgetting old ones. Cutting-edge neuroimaging techniques
allow scientists to study plasticity in the brain’s neocortex during human
continued learning; in AI research, this development has led to the creation
of new deep-learning neural networks that solve the catastrophic forgetting
problem. As a practical matter, the use of neuroscience in AI development
seems to be leading to machines that can learn quickly and without thought
instead of having to be “retaught” through costly and processing-intensive
cloud computers.
The pace of today’s research is rapid and fueled by advancements beyond
pure software: “neurorobotics” is a field born from the combination of
neuroscience, robotics, and AI.6 Neurorobotics devices use biologically
inspired neural networking systems which are implemented into physical
platforms. In turn, such devices are integral to the development of industrialgrade robotics, prosthetics, and even primitive nanomachines. Just as these
technologies promise to reinvent industry, our traditional understanding of
legal rules and systems could be at the precipice of major change.
Nonetheless, AI is something of a buzzword across the legal industry.
There is still a certain mystique to the technology’s functionality that this
Symposium intended to clarify while also assessing how it can affect legal
regimes. In particular, this Symposium focused on problems posed by
current and very near-future AI research and development with the aim to
facilitate a dialogue among those who will shape the future of this impactful
technology: neuroscientists, computer scientists, attorneys, and business
professionals. As researchers continue to use neuroscience to make AI more
“human” in its reasoning, the technology has encountered a range of human
legal problems, including discrimination and bias, civil liability for risktaking, and ownership of data and creative content.
Variants of the technology are also being used across many disciplines.
Arguably, nowhere is the technology’s application more prominent than in
the financial services sector. AI is part of a new wave of cost-reducing
financial technologies—all of which have the potential to change the way
people and institutions interact with capital. At the same time, these
in 1988, a surge of growing interest by the computer science community in experimental
neuroscience and the insights it will produce).
6. See Marco Iosa et al., The Three Laws of Neurorobotics: A Review of What
Neurorehabilitation Robots Should Do for Patients and Clinicians, 36 J. MED. BIOLOGICAL
ENGINEERING 1, 2 (2016) (“Neurorobotics refers to the branch of science combining
neuroscience, robotics, and artificial intelligence. It hence refers to all robots developed for
interacting with or for emulating the nervous systems of humans or other animals.”); see also
Frederic Kaplan, Neurorobotics: An Experimental Science of Embodiment, FRONTIERS
NEUROSCIENCE (Aug. 1, 2008), https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/neuro.01.
023.2008/full [https://perma.cc/S7T3-RNJ7] (“At the interface of neuroscience and robotics,
neurorobotics is the science and technology of embodied autonomous neural systems.”).
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machines threaten to multiply existing financial risks or to create entirely
new ones.
Regardless of the industry, ethical standards for the development of AI will
be crucial. There is a popular adage in the world of computing: “garbage in,
garbage out.” In essence, this idea tells us that flawed inputs will yield
flawed results. It is an unfortunate reality that human beings are imperfect
and susceptible to errors, biases, and prejudices. It is thus integral to reduce
the impact that human judgments have on the tools we use. The transition to
a world of algorithmic governance is not without its potential costs. As is
particularly salient in the national discourse, it appears that our privacy is
something of a premium. With the next great advancement in automated
decision-making, individuals may stand to lose in privacy what they gain in
convenience.
I. HOW NEUROSCIENCE AND ETHICS INFORM ROBOTS AND THE LAWS
GOVERNING THEM
AI and robotics are at the forefront of tomorrow’s algorithmic society.
Thanks to the latest neuroimaging devices, modern neuroscience has
revealed deep insights into human reasoning and cognition. Some of the
most promising developments in AI research are inspired by neuroscience.
Deep learning and reinforcement learning, two foundational pieces of
modern AI development, attempt to replicate neurological communication
mathematically. As AI is used for more complex tasks, it stands to benefit
from even more nuanced understandings of human reasoning.
This Symposium starts with some of the big-picture trends in modern AI
and robotics research, especially those pertaining to the influence of
neuroscience. Stunningly, robots and AI algorithms have demonstrated
cognitive reasoning capabilities to the extent that they can replicate creative
pursuits, like art and music. The notion of legal personhood for AI systems
has become a less far-fetched proposition in light of advances in the
technology that mirror (if only rudimentarily so) certain aspects of the human
thought process. This begs the question of what kinds of legal regimes and
techniques will be best suited for dealing with questions of liability.
Iria Giuffrida confronts these issues directly by examining the legal
consequences of the construction and marketing of AI systems—especially
when “technical advancements have outpaced legal actions”7—while also
considering whether the problems with AI merit a revised perspective with
respect to liability.8 For example, the surge in AI has been cultivated in part
by developments in machine learning, which pertain to an AI system’s
capacity to alter itself by allowing for new data9 with which it can pinpoint
patterns for purposes of prediction.10 While AI can examine vast amounts of
7. Iria Giuffrida, Liability for AI Decision-Making:
Considerations, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 439, 440 (2019).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 441.
10. Id.

Some Legal and Ethical
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data, “[t]he risk of AI error is huge,”11 especially if the AI system takes in
data that is biased and fallacious.12 Indeed, even a correctly designed starting
program “may modify its ‘understanding’ to accept the biased or false
information as accurate and perform its function based on that erroneous
data.”13
This fallible “AI Ecosystem” has created a complex combination of legal
rules; yet, Giuffrida’s major interest concerns liability risks especially
considering the vast array of potentially responsible parties who could get
involved when a problem occurs.14 As she explains, “[t]here are AI
developers; algorithm trainers; data collectors, controllers, and processors;
manufacturers of the devices incorporating the AI software; owners of the
software (which are not necessarily the developers)”; and of course the
consumers and users of the products who also could be highly varied and
layered.15
Giuffrida’s primary concern is whether these kinds of questions warrant a
revised solution to liability, and her potential solutions are fourfold.16 The
first solution is to provide AI with legal personhood,17 which would mandate
that the AI system be able to hold assets either directly (like a corporation)
or indirectly (like a licensor or licensee of the AI system acting on the
system’s behalf).18 In this capacity, the AI system’s liability risk would
differ based on “the nature of the AI,” such as whether or not it is located in
a physical object,19 as well as the AI system’s purpose. For example, there
are predictive systems that aid human decision-making, as well as fully
autonomous systems that do not involve human input.20 In this context, any
harm that the AI system causes could be a direct result of how the AI is
programmed, thus potentially creating an intentional tort based on “negligent
design, training, or operation (e.g., lack of adequate cyber security
protections); or an arguably unforeseeable harm caused by an interaction
with unforeseeable real-world data.”21 Indeed, Giuffrida provides several
examples of how risk, causation, and responsibility could pose challenges in
assessing AI cases.22
Giuffrida’s second solution is to “leave AI alone,”23 which assumes that
the major question should be “by what standard should we determine liability
when unacceptable harm occurs but its causation cannot be determined,”
especially in situations where there is minimal human oversight of the
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. at 442.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 443.
Id.
Id. at 444.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 444–45.
Id. at 445.
Id.
See id. at 446–47.
Id. at 447.
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system’s decisions or predictions.24 The recommendations proposed for selfdriving cars are good examples, and Giuffrida highlights an especially
appealing one—the use of a mandatory no-fault type of insurance process in
which a victim injured by a self-driving car is paid a certain sum without the
need to establish how the car caused the victim’s injury.25
The third solution may be to view “the harm as a necessary societal cost”
and adopt “robot common sense.”26 Giuffrida provides as an example a
Wisconsin Supreme Court decision, State v. Loomis,27 which upheld a
judge’s use of COMPAS, an AI predictive device, in determining the
defendant’s sentence.28 The court stressed that it was the judge—not the
AI—that sentenced the defendant and that the COMPAS device was only one
of a number of factors that the judge considered.29 Yet the concept of robot
common sense raises an underlying principle. While judicial sentencing is
inherently flawed, technologically enhanced sentencing “has at least the
possibility of improving over time and curing the current—and defective—
human system.”30
The fourth solution is a harms-based approach, which would make the
“compensation-deterrence methodology” harm-specific rather than
tortfeasor-specific. Thus, the harm created by self-driving cars may be more
feasibly covered by a no-fault compensation system if the cars have inherent
risks associated with them.31 That said, while this solution may be appealing
to those companies that would prefer to internalize the costs of liability rather
than change their products,32 critics contend that companies will instead take
the risk and spread the predicted cost of liability to consumers. In turn, there
would be little financial motivation for companies to avoid harm.33
Regulation may be an alternative to tort suits, but it also has complications.34
Regardless of the approach, Giuffrida stresses that “we must unavoidably
deal with a cost-benefit analysis.”35
Giuffrida offers a new approach to these four solutions. Instead of
proposing a compensatory system for AI harms, she recommends focusing
on “identifying and dissuading (and perhaps compensating) the major
predictive harms, with the understanding that constant reevaluation will be
necessary.”36 In addition, recent ethical codes directed toward AI systems
could provide some guidance. These include the 2018 adoption by the
European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice of the Council of Europe
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 448.
Id. at 448–49.
Id. at 449.
881 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2016).
Giuffrida, supra note 7, at 449–50.
Id. at 449.
Id. at 450.
Id.
Id. at 452.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 453.
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of the European Ethical Charter on the Use of Artificial Intelligence in
Judicial Systems.37 In addition, the High-Level Expert Group on AI
appointed by the European Commission published the final version of its
Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI in mid-2019.38 Likewise, the Beijing
Academy of Artificial Intelligence released the Beijing AI Principles, which
were followed in July 2019 by the Governance Principles for the New
Generation Artificial Intelligence and published by the National Governance
Committee for the New Generation Artificial Intelligence. As Giuffrida
notes, the Beijing AI Principles seem to recommend that AI developers seek
informed consent before buyers use their products, thereby suggesting the
potential for data protection measures similar to those provided by European
countries.39
The United States has gone in a different direction. While Executive Order
13,859 of February 2019 “clearly encourages the development of American
AI,” it fails to refer to ethics.40 The Algorithmic Accountability Act of 2019
demonstrates congressional concern with regulating AI and it includes an
emphasis on bias in AI decision-making; yet it does not make itself obliged
to particular ethical values.41 In contrast, private entities, such as Big Tech,
are developing a framework for an ethical AI system, exemplified by
Google’s decision to avoid a contract in which the military could use their
AI advances.42 In a nutshell, the U.S. solution is mostly privately driven.43
Giuffrida concludes that, while some type of AI system regulation “is
inevitable,” the most important concerns are those related to the ethics of AI
systems. In addition to greater transparency and explanation, “the best
models” will derive “from interdisciplinary efforts.”44
Along with Giuffrida, Gerhard Wagner points out that, currently, robots
and other autonomous systems do not have personhood and their owners are
typically responsible for them.45 The European Parliament predicts that, at
some point, there will be a “special legal status for robots”—seemingly as
“electronic persons” or “ePersons”46 that would be responsible for any
damage they caused, most likely under tort law. Yet, Wagner questions
whether such a reclassification “makes sense.”47 For example, personhood
requires a range of criteria, such as consciousness, self-awareness, and
mental and emotional capacity; yet there is no firm consensus regarding
which of these criteria are necessary conditions for acknowledging

37. Id. at 454.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 455.
40. Id. at 456.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Gerhard Wagner, Robot, Inc.: Personhood for Autonomous Systems?, 88 FORDHAM
L. REV. 591, 592 (2019).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 593.
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consciousness.48 Not only are the features of personhood “a matter of
degree,”49 rather than “either/or,” but the primary feature “is the ability to act
as an autonomous subject.”50 In addition, philosophical approaches to
personhood diverge from legal ones. Wagner notes, for example, that
consequentialist approaches, such as utilitarianism, emphasize “whether
autonomous systems qualify as sentient beings capable of feeling pleasure
and pain”51 (a reigning utilitarian argument in the realm of animal rights).52
In turn, “the criteria used by the legal system to define personhood are
primarily biological.”53
Wagner also questions whether robots and other autonomous devices can
be regarded as “liability subjects,”54 a matter based primarily on “whether
there are good reasons to treat them like as legal persons.”55 Those “good
reasons” derive from a similar framework delineating the personhood status
of corporations: they will be predominantly economic56 and focused on
whether robots “qualify as wrongdoers” and not on how much they resemble
human beings.57 Wagner’s determination depends on an economic calculus:
“[t]he objective is to maximize the net surplus for society, i.e., the difference
between the gain from activities involving robots and the costs of producing
and operating them, including the costs of precautions and the costs of
accidents that occur in spite of cost-effective precautions.”58
In support of his approach, Wagner specifies liability frameworks for two
“distinct groups” of liability subjects, namely manufacturers and users, to
gauge where robot liability could fall59 as well as the method of risk
allocation through contract.60 According to Wagner, robot technology will
move the control over the machines and appliances away from the users to
the manufacturers,61 in which case manufacturers of robots will have
substantially more power over robots than the manufacturers of mechanical
products currently possess.62 Such control will be particularly evident where
a closed software system is in place because only the manufacturer will be
able to expand the device’s safety features, for example.63 In contrast, in an
open-system approach, the assignment of responsibilities may be far more
complex given the numbers and types of parties involved, including the first
set of equipment manufacturers and the many suppliers of component parts,
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 594.
Id. at 595.
Id.
Id. at 596.
Id. at 596–97.
Id. at 598.
Id. at 599.
Id.
Id. at 600.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 601.
Id.
Id. at 602.
Id.
Id. at 602–63.
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such as owners and operators.64 Therefore, classifying the robot as an
“ePerson” would “relieve the victim of the burden of identifying the
responsible party and would spare courts the task of allocating liability
between a multitude of defendants.”65
In essence, robots and other autonomous systems will introduce new
complications for standard tests of products liability, including the consumer
expectations and risk utility products liability tests,66 as well as to the legal
system’s current understanding of design defect.67 Wagner therefore
suggests “a system-oriented concept of design defect” in which the major
focus will be whether the system at issue “causes an unreasonable number of
accidents overall.”68 Nonetheless, Wagner also recognizes that such an
approach will create problems for competition in the marketplace because it
may force a situation in which the finding of a design defect may be based
on an “‘optimal algorithm test’ that discriminates against all but the best
algorithm in the market.”69 In addition, the users of robots and other
autonomous systems should operate with a restricted duty of care because
they will possess only very limited control over the devices they manage.70
Wagner takes time to assess the advantages and disadvantages of accepting
robots as legal entities that have liability.71 A powerful disadvantage is that
robots are unable to pay damage claims.72 Likewise, if robots were ePersons,
all the actors involved in the robot’s creation would be protected from
liability73 and injured victims would not be compensated.74 One suggestion
to counter this scenario is to require either that robots possess “a minimum
of assets in order to qualify as a legal entity” or that they be accompanied
with mandatory liability insurance.75 The drawback is that these costs, if
incurred by manufacturers, would be passed on to the users.76
Wagner is skeptical about how much robots will be able to accommodate
a liability system irrespective of these proposed solutions. Even if robots
were programmed to “learn” from past accidents and experiences and
algorithmically adjust themselves accordingly, the capacity for this software
improvement would still be controlled by the decisions made by software
programmers.77 Yet, because “potential ePersons are unreceptive to
financial incentives to avoid harm” in the way humans are, Wagner perceives

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 603.
Id.
Id. at 605.
Id.
Id. at 606.
Id.
Id. at 607.
Id. at 593.
Id. at 609.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 610.
See id.
Id. at 611.
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problems with respect to deterring robots’ injurious behavior “even if
minimum asset requirements or insurance mandates apply.”78
In essence, then, Wagner concludes that there is little to be gained by
making robots ePersons.79 From an economic perspective, making the
ePerson liable would result in only limited liability of its manufacturers and
users.80 That said, if robots and autonomous systems succeed in producing
the “great savings in accident costs that they are promised to, then no liability
subsidy is needed” and there may be advantages to designating them
ePersons after all.81
II. AI, ETHICS, AND FINANCIAL MARKETS: THE RISKS FACED ON WALL
STREET AND MAIN STREET
The Symposium’s second group of articles focuses on the impact of AI on
the financial services sector. Big money players like asset managers and
banks have been aggressive investors in the technology, aiming to capture
value realized by other industries, while remaining wary of reputational and
regulatory pitfalls. Finance has a lengthy history with predictive technology,
which dates back to the industry’s dalliances with algorithmic and highfrequency trading.
Today, financial firms also envision AI as a means to lower costs and
improve customer relations across entire organizations. The upsides are
tantalizing for institutions and customers alike. Robo-advisors, for example,
offer automated investment advice that can provide inexperienced retail
investors with no need for an investment manager with low-cost access to
capital markets. Managers, on the other hand, can devote their human
resources to more complex accounts or strategies that demand human
reasoning (and higher fees). The integration of AI into finance can
theoretically offer high margins and new profit opportunities for Wall Street.
For consumers on Main Street, financial technology has promised lower-cost
services and greater access to lending for groups typically underserved by
traditional finance.
There are risks, however, and the real-world integration of AI in this space
can often fall far short of the ideal. Overreliance on automated decisionmaking exacerbates systemic financial risks. Meanwhile, consumers taking
advantage of new-age, AI-enabled services risk exposure to potentially
predatory or discriminatory lenders. The role of AI in finance has been both
profitable and socially desirable yet also detrimental in many ways.82
According to Tom C.W. Lin, there are “four inherent areas of intertwined
risks and limitations relating to programming codes, data bias, virtual threats,

78. Id.
79. Id. at 611–12.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 612.
82. Tom C.W. Lin, Artificial Intelligence, Finance, and the Law, 88 FORDHAM L. REV.
531, 532 (2019).
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and systemic risks.”83 The first risk concerns the limitations of AI code and
the inherent unpredictability of markets. Lin argues that AI programs are
thus far unable to accurately model the key risks in the marketplace.84 Lin
suggests that market risks warrant consideration beyond pure mathematics;
communication in boardrooms or on trading floors is ultimately conducted
by humans, complete with flawed and nuanced cues that are unable to be
captured in code.85 Lin notes the industry’s tendency to ignore this
proposition and place blind faith into these “infallible” machines, citing the
2008 financial crisis as a consequence of this thinking.86
The second risk, which deals with discriminatory data and algorithmic
biases, raises the need to recognize the kinds of latent prejudices that exist in
data so that they do not contribute to algorithmic distortions against certain
individuals or groups.87 As Lin stresses, it is imperative that AI systems do
not introduce past or present discrimination into future technology “under the
blended gloss of innovation, neutrality, and objectivity.”88
The third risk pertains to cybersecurity risks posed by both external and
internal parties.89 External system breaches can range from simple acts of
theft to state or nonstate actors attempting to disrupt the American financial
infrastructure. Meanwhile, preexisting internal threats posed by actors like
disgruntled employees or corporate spies can take on greater magnitude due
to the speed at which monetary transfers now occur.90 Because such threats
have become more imperceptible, they are more challenging to prevent and
defeat,91 and these problems will grow only more daunting as the financial
industry increases its reliance on AI.92
The fourth risk deals with the systemic perils and financial mishaps
associated with the growing use of financial AI and technology.93 These
risks relate to the growing size of financial institutions (which carries with it
more risks), their increasing speed (which enables greater disruptions in the
system before corrections can be introduced), and linkages among firms
(which allow errors in one system to destabilize other systems as well).94
The result, Lin warns, can be a system of institutions that possess too much
data to fail and that operate too quickly for humans to mitigate financial
accidents.95

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 533.
Id. at 534.
Id. at 535.
Id.
Id. at 536–37.
Id. at 538.
See id.
See id. at 539.
Id. at 540.
Id.
Id. at 541.
See id. at 542.
Id. at 541.
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In light of these risks, Lin investigates possible responses,96 especially
with respect to financial cybersecurity97 and the private parties who may
have competing interests regarding their control of the “global
cyberinfrastructure.”98 As Lin stresses, public policymakers must start to
provide global incentives for private firms to “cooperate better with other
firms and public regulators” in light of the increasingly ominous threats of
cybersecurity attacks.99 Likewise, because financial AI will heavily
influence competition within the financial industry, firms with larger data
sets may have competitive advantages in the marketplace that can impair
consumer welfare and the health of the financial landscape.100 As a result,
policymakers must be aware of such hazards and their implications.101
Lastly, the growth of financial AI will influence individuals and society
alike regarding the role humans will have in finance as well as what role
finance will have in society, including shared values such as equal access and
transparency.102 Such goals will be challenging given the clash between old
and new politics and the diverse approaches to regulating new financial
technology.103 Ensuring the role of human participants is imperative104 to
maintaining “the people-centered, social purposes of finance.”105 Thus, the
evolution of financial AI—with all of its power and potential—can also harm
individuals.106 The key goal “is to create better financial artificial
intelligence—one that is less artificial, more intelligent, and ultimately more
humane, and more human.”107
Although Lin notes the systemic risks associated with the use of AI in
traditional finance, individuals can face more direct risks. Kristin Johnson,
Frank Pasquale, and Jennifer Chapman’s essay concerns the growth and
potential dominance of financial technology (“fintech”) firms.108 Fintech
firms incorporate the advantages garnered by learning algorithms—a type of
AI—to decrease transaction fees and increase interest rates on deposits and
other payments.109 Compared to the established legacy firms, which initially
eschewed mobile banking, fintech firms can better find and service
consumers by more accurately evaluating consumer creditworthiness and
assessing business risks.110 In addition, by using facially neutral, objective
96. Id. at 533.
97. Id. at 543.
98. Id. at 544.
99. Id. at 545.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 548.
102. Id. at 548–50.
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108. Kristin Johnson, Frank Pasquale & Jennifer Chapman, Artificial Intelligence, Machine
Learning, and Bias in Finance: Toward Responsible Innovation, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 499,
499–500 (2019).
109. Id. at 501.
110. Id.
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criteria, the learning algorithms mitigate creditors’ exposure to claims of
intentional or unintentional discrimination against borrowers who are
members of legally protected classes.111 According to the authors, however,
in 2018 the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) undermined
this goal by allowing fintech firms to apply for special national banking
charters, which allow them to evade important state consumer finance
regulations, including those on payday lending and usury.112
This essay questions the presumption that, through the use of learning
algorithms, fintech firms help marginalized and low-income individuals by
emphasizing two grave concerns. First, the authors contend that AI-driven
platforms that fintech firms rely on may mirror the biases of their
programmers or input data, thereby fueling discrimination against members
of legally protected classes.113 Second, the devices that machine learning
algorithms use to identify and service marginalized and low-income
consumers may also be used to single them out. There are legal and ethical
implications to either of these outcomes: not only may the fintech firms be
contravening equal access credit statutes, they could also further marginalize
legally protected groups and low-income individuals who are often victims
of predatory tactics.114
The authors contend that, although fintech firms initially celebrated the
advances in access to financial services brought by learning algorithms, there
have been dangerous unintended consequences.115 For example, even
though the facially neutral learning algorithms eliminate biases that can come
from face-to-face decisions in financial services, there is evidence that
incomplete or inaccurate data sets may distort the algorithms’ objectivity. In
addition, the quest by such algorithms to seek the most efficient path to solve
a problem may result in targeting a purportedly neutral attribute in data sets
that may in fact be a proxy for a legally protected trait. Therefore, such an
approach may produce a discriminatory outcome regardless of whether the
program developers intended to create an algorithm that should not
discriminate based on that very same trait.116 As the authors underscore,
overlooking the potential for such biases “may weaponize [automated
decision-making platforms]”117 and further hinder the effectiveness of
accountability standards. These dangers are especially evident in light of
recently adopted federal banking regulations that may support such advances
“but leave the most marginalized individuals and families deeply vulnerable
to exploitation and discrimination as fintech firms dominate the financial
markets.”118
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The authors also discuss the challenge of regulatory oversight by detailing
the origins of the OCC’s “Fintech Charter Decision”; the tensions
accompanying it;119 its unique design;120 the federal laws, rules, regulations
to which it is subject;121 and the authors’ concern that the Fintech Charter
Decision “severely restricts state financial services regulators’ oversight.”122
The authors conclude that the Fintech Charter Decision imperils state
regulatory agencies’ oversight of predatory and unethical practices and
hinders state regulators’ ability to fund contemporary and future consumer
protection enforcement efforts.123
The authors end by emphasizing the need for courts and regulators to
weigh the advantages that fintech firms introduce with the strengths of
historic banking platforms that provided a protective oversight role.124 They
also recommend formal rules that would restrict or, in some cases,
completely ban regulators’ reliance on algorithms in consumer credit
markets.125 In addition, the authors believe that explaining the programming
behind AI models and applications could help resolve the issue of bias126 and
create a sense of trust between the algorithm and its user127 as well as inform
users about the system’s flaws and how it should be properly operating.128 If
state and federal regulators work together to produce a uniform set of
standards, they can reduce duplicate costs and conflicts129 and provide
enhanced oversight over potential biases and predatory targeting while also
maintaining a balance between state and federal banking supervisors.130 In
essence, “thoughtful collaboration among state and federal regulators” could
help construct “the best approach to achieve early and widely endorsed
interventions that promote the accountability, transparency, and
explainability” of learning algorithms.131
III. CONSUMER PRIVACY, ETHICAL DATA PRACTICES, AND THE IMPACT OF
AI ON DEMOCRACY
The Symposium’s final set of articles address data protection and
collection issues. Modern AI relies on the collection of vast amounts of data.
This information can provide us with conveniences and with initiatives like
119. Id.
120. Id. at 513 (“Banks that receive state charters are subject to the day-to-day supervision
of state banking regulators but cannot evade federal regulation. Federal regulators supervise
federally chartered banks and, to mitigate the challenges of complying with dual—and, at
times, incongruent—regulatory obligations, federally chartered banks need only comply with
limited state regulatory mandates.”(footnote omitted)).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 519.
123. Id.
124. See id. at 505.
125. Id. at 522.
126. See id. at 523.
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128. Id. at 524.
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“smart cities” offering to use AI as a means to make life easier. At the same
time, people’s data can be put at risk. For example, consider AI programs
that use patient medical information to make decisions—these offer new
avenues of vulnerability. There can, however, be a lack of clarity by
regulators and lawmakers regarding how seriously AI can implicate these
concerns. Data regulation can exist as a patchwork that can quickly be
rendered obsolete as technology progresses.
Regulators and governmental agents thus partner with the private sector to
implement promising AI-centric initiatives. Sometimes, however, this
relationship can result in the private sector assuming a sort of custodianship
over traditionally “public” activities, like distributing public resources or
protecting free speech. This circumstance begs the question: what are the
implications on our society of relying so heavily on automated decisionmaking?
In their article, Ellen P. Goodman and Julia Powles examine the 2017
creation of the first model smart city in Toronto, Canada by Google affiliate
Sidewalk Labs in partnership with Waterfront Toronto, a public development
agency designed to revitalize the city’s waterfront area.132 This partnership,
as the authors note, spurred intense national and international discourse
concerning “innovation, privatization, privacy, surveillance, control, and the
future of cities and urban life.”133 The authors do not inherently oppose the
technology as a means to achieve urban reform, but they are troubled by the
dominance of a single company, Google, performing community functions
and controlling public life on Toronto’s eastern waterfront. The authors
believe that requirements should have been put in place initially to allay these
concerns, most particularly the overriding role of just one company.134
The authors begin with the backdrop of Sidewalk’s hasty development and
the opaque process through which the project was approved. The authors
explain that the Board of Waterfront Toronto was provided just a few days
to examine the agreements that would govern its relationship with Sidewalk
prior to being pushed to approve it. Even though the project garnered
substantial interest by the public and the media, especially regarding issues
such as ownership and governance, many city officials remained unclear
about its long-term impact.135 Regardless of how Sidewalk develops over
the ensuing years, this first stage illustrates the perils of rushing to create a
“smart city.” It also demonstrates the implications of a clash between one of
the world’s most influential companies and a small, but highly informed,
group of citizens, journalists, and community-based associations.136
The authors detail the starting stages of Sidewalk, ranging from Waterfront
Toronto’s initial request for proposals in March 2017 to the revelation of the
132. Ellen P. Goodman & Julia Powles, Urbanism Under Google: Lessons from Sidewalk
Toronto, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 457, 458 (2019).
133. Id. at 459.
134. Id. at 498.
135. Id. at 466.
136. Id. at 460.
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“Master Innovation and Development Plan” in spring 2019, all the while
emphasizing the extraordinary secrecy and ambiguity that enveloped the
process.137 Ontario’s auditor general would later conclude that the parties
involved selected “Sidewalk precipitously without adequately consulting the
appropriate governmental entities.”138 For example, while the parties
involved publicly released a four-page summary of the 2017 “Framework
Agreement” between Waterfront Toronto and Sidewalk, they kept
confidential the full twenty-nine-page agreement in addition to a number of
other agreements they entered into.139 The secrecy concerning the
Framework Agreement, though perhaps typical of the Silicon Valley private
sector, fueled an outcry by members of the community as well as public
officials,140 especially given both the monetary and nonfinancial costs of the
project.
The authors are particularly critical of Sidewalk’s proposed “digital layer”
that would merge together different aspects of urban life within a vision of
the “city as platform.”141 Yet, for the public, this proposal had three major
problems: “privatization, platformization, and domination.”142 Sidewalk’s
“digital layer” promised robust data collection mechanisms that would, in
turn, allow applications to autonomously deliver public services to
citizens.143 At the same time, Sidewalk’s pervasive digital design, through
its reliance on vast data flows and automated decision-making, would allow
the company to control the activities that occurred over its network.144
Because Sidewalk’s vision is inexact, it hinders the ability of citizens to
question its construction or to suggest methods of accountability.145
Likewise, Sidewalk’s depiction of “urban data” would make it so that “all
places [would] become exposed and marketized.”146
The authors make clear that their critique is neither aimed at technological
advances nor urban innovation but rather at the enormous control of
Alphabet-Google via Sidewalk “over nearly every aspect of the future
district.”147 The authors recommend procedures that could alleviate some of
their criticisms, including impact assessments for all of the project’s
proposed services;148 nonetheless, they also give the sense that such
recommendations may be “too late” because they could inadvertently
endorse the “structural compromises” that have already been made.149
Instead, all cities, including Toronto, should seek urban innovation but also
137.
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avoid providing such a key role to just one company. In contrast, Sidewalk
has introduced a “vision where its own upper hand in platform control, data
governance, intellectual property, procurement, and access has at each turn
an obvious and legitimate alternative: the hand of the city itself.”150
David W. Opderbeck discusses another realm in which AI risks clashing
with the public interest—health care. Specifically, AI is fueling an
intersection between the pharmaceutical and medical device industries.151
For example, the contributions of “big datasets and complex algorithms will
integrate the development and delivery of small- and large-molecule drugs,
genetic therapies, and medical devices tailored to specific user profiles and
even to individual consumers, with dynamic, real-time updates and
adjustments.”152 As a result, Opderbeck contends, the legal system will
require revised regulatory models in light of the increasingly muted
distinctions between software code, medical technology, and drugs.
Opderbeck supports his arguments by discussing the means by which AI
might substantially alter the present legal and economic scheme in the United
States for drugs, biologics, and medical devices.153 The Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act, through the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA),
“governs the sale of prescription drugs.” The FDA is also in charge of
“regulating biologics and medical devices”154—a vast responsibility that
ensures that a drug is safe, effective, and properly labeled before it is
presented to the FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and Research in a “New
Opderbeck also describes the discovery,
Drug Application.”155
developments, and preclinical and clinical research that is involved with the
introduction of a new drug.156
More recently, scientists have begun examining “large-molecule biologic
products” as well as genomics in contrast to more traditional small-molecule
pharmaceutical drugs.157 Most drugs currently approved to sell on the
market, and which are most familiar to the public, are small-molecule
drugs.158 While large-molecule drugs face the same scrutiny and approval
process as their small molecule counterparts, they are substantially more
complex and more difficult to assess for use on humans.159 In contrast, there

150. Id.
151. David W. Opderbeck, Artificial Intelligence in Pharmaceuticals, Biologics, and
Medical Devices: Present and Future Regulatory Models, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 553, 553
(2019).
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153. Id. at 554.
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156. See id.
157. See id. at 557. “Large-molecule or ‘biologic’ drugs are made of proteins, usually
copied or modified from existing human proteins,” which “can be engineered to bind
selectively to diseased cells, such as cancer cells.” Id.
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is currently no approval process for genetic therapies, another class of drug
treatment, in the United States, and they are still considered experimental.160
Medical devices are subject to a different approval process altogether.
They are classified according to three different levels of safety and
effectiveness,161 and the approval process differs according to the device’s
class.162 Opderbeck claims that AI will likely upend these regulatory
processes163 by enhancing substantially the rate of standard biochemical and
genetic research and decreasing the time, cost, error, and ethical challenges
associated with human trials by relying on “in silico modeling” (i.e.,
computer simulations).164
While some AI devices are already being applied for these purposes,165
challenges remain before these advances can go further.166 Opderbeck is
optimistic about how quickly AI will advance future research, ranging from
reducing the costs of new drugs167 to helping to customize individualized
drug treatments or implants, to producing “highly customizable genetic
therapies applicable only to a small population, perhaps even to specific
individuals who could afford them.”168 Yet each new advance in AI in this
field unearths the ethical challenges concerning “accountability, equity, and
privacy.”169
Opderbeck also discusses in detail new procedures currently being
developed at the FDA for AI-driven in silico trials and medical devices as
well as investigations into how AI may affect those procedures in the ensuing
decades.170 He observes that, although the “FDA is ahead of the game in
creating guidance relating to AI and medical devices” and “seems to be
behind concerning drugs, biologics, and genetic therapies,”171 medical
devices entail fewer public health risks. That said, he urges further regulatory
development in privacy and security for medical devices,172 noting that the
FDA has failed to provide guidance on privacy.173 Similarly, Opderbeck
argues that the FDA should offer counsel regarding virtual patient models for
in silico trials,174 while noting the potential downside of working with private
companies175 and recommending that virtual patient models be placed into
an open-source repository as one solution.176
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With growing advances in AI technology, the FDA may need to develop
new regulatory categories as well as greater privacy, accountability,177 and
modifications in intellectual property paradigms.178 In addition, AI spurs
topics such as concerns over global equity179 as well as discussions about AI
in drug and medical device production at the international level.180 Toward
these ends, Opderbeck contributes recommendations. First, he suggests that
the FDA should provide clear privacy guidelines relating to AI and medical
devices and trials, with the long-term goal of adopting a comprehensive,
cross-sector data protection regime that is specifically tailored for AI.181 In
addition, Congress can revise regulatory models to accommodate the changes
in intellectual property, privacy, and accountability that AI will bring.182 As
Opderbeck concludes, by 2050, “advances in AI could herald a new era in
which goals of distributive justice relating to global public health could be
more fully realized” and that advancements require “a new international AI
treaty regime that accounts for public health values.”183
Goodman and Powell’s article on the Sidewalk Labs story and
Opderbeck’s article on the challenges impacting the FDA both demonstrate
the practical and regulatory hurdles facing the proliferation of AI. As a dataintensive system, AI necessarily implicates data protection, cybersecurity,
and user privacy issues. As both articles demonstrate, however, there can be
a lack of clarity or true appreciation among regulatory governmental bodies
about the scope of these issues. As a consequence, private sector entities,
whether they be Google or medical device manufacturers, can exert influence
over the public interest. However, the role of public interest custodianship
can be at odds with private sector commercial interests and norms.
This trend is also apparent when dealing with the internet and social
networking. The article by Madeline Byrd and Katherine J. Strandburg
examines section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (“CDA 230”),
which the authors contend gives “providers and users of ‘interactive
computer services’ sweeping exemption from liability for actionable content
created or published by others.”184 CDA 230, while often credited as “the
law that gave us the modern internet,”185 has spurred heated debated from
those who claim that the Act has filled the internet with inaccurate and
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distorted information that is biased against women and minority groups.186
The authors focus on CDA 230 liability with respect to the increasing use of
“smart services,” which tailor content based on models and predictive data
on individual users. They also use, as a case study, recent legal challenges
to Facebook’s ad-targeting platform.187
The authors provide support for their viewpoints by outlining CDA 230’s
background and the relevant case law in terms of “a secondary liability
frame.”188 They emphasize that, in 1996, Congress expected that if online
service providers were removed from liability, the providers would offer
technological methods to resolve the content-screening challenges.189
Today, however, the authors contend that there is far too much usergenerated content to effectively screen for actionable defamatory, harassing,
or offensive conduct.190 The drafters of CDA 230 greatly miscalculated the
potential form and volume of offensive content and “would have been
horrified by the tsunami of racist, sexist, homophobic, fraudulent, untruthful,
and otherwise hurtful discourse that has accompanied the internet’s
benefits.”191
As the authors explain, under CDA 230 a defendant is protected if they are
categorized as a publisher of information given by another content
provider.192 Yet because CDA 230 does not define “publisher,” courts have
experienced difficulty in interpreting the term’s meaning.193 In turn, earlier
cases shielded “service providers against both ‘publisher’ and ‘distributor’
liability.”194 Such shielding has encouraged courts to interpret CDA 230
broadly.195
That said, CDA 230 does define an “‘information content provider’ as ‘any
person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or
development of information provided through the Internet or any other
interactive computer service.’”196 Accordingly, courts have “routinely
treated service providers as potentially liable ‘information content providers’
when they or their employees independently created or developed actionable
content” (that is, courts have denied immunity under these circumstances);
but courts have consistently granted immunity “when plaintiffs alleged
merely that a provider knew that a service was being used for illegal purposes
or profited from a third party’s creation and publication of actionable
content.”197 Between these two extremes, however, there exist intermediate
cases in which courts will granted or denied immunity based on the degree
186.
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to which the service provider can be said to have “developed” the content in
question.198 This distinction, however, is not a bright-line analysis.199
The authors also explain Facebook’s ad-targeting platform, which uses
automated processes to select an audience for certain advertisements based
on users’ site activity and some offline data sources.200 This methodology
can, according to empirical research, produce biased targeting201 and
demographic disparities in the base audience.202 As a result, the National
Fair Housing Alliance filed a class action lawsuit which, in March 2019,
settled with a consent decree that “requires Facebook to limit the ways in
which the tools . . . can be used for targeting housing, employment, or credit”
advertisements.203 Facebook will make these changes “[o]n or before
September 30, 2019,” using a tool called HEC Flow, which will change the
audience selection tools in a number of ways.204
As a way of providing a foundational background, the authors elucidate
the principles of discriminatory advertising law under the Fair Housing Act
(FHA) and discuss the potential liability for Facebook’s audience selection
tools.205 Assuming Facebook’s ad-targeting platform has incurred liability
for actionable discrimination, the authors then assess Facebook’s liability for
failure to correct under 24 C.F.R. 100.7(a)(iii)206 and contend that the
company could be liable.207 A court could find that Facebook should be
liable for “failure to correct” discriminatory attribute-based targeting as well
as the disparities which resulted from its lookalike audiences tool.208 The
authors then use a parallel type of analysis in examining CDA 230’s
applicability to Facebook’s audience selection tools,209 emphasizing that
courts “are thus likely to conclude that ad targeting is at least generally a
‘publisher’ activity and to reject plaintiffs’ arguments that ‘failure to correct’
claims in particular are beyond the scope of CDA 230.”210
Byrd and Strandburg also examine CDA 230 from a secondary liability
perspective,211 noting that CDA 230 most likely does protect Facebook from
the FHA’s effectively secondary “failure to correct” liability and
emphasizing that “allegations of discriminatory ad targeting have nothing to
do with content development.” In short, “CDA 230 was simply not designed
or intended to handle situations in which a service provider’s activities as a
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publisher are actionable but the published content is not.”212 While courts
have attempted to discover approaches for applying CDA 230 to smart online
service providers, they have faced challenges because the definition of
“information content provider” is the only relevant provision.213
In acknowledging the limits of CDA 230,214 the authors offer
recommendations. First, they suggest amending CDA 230 “to clarify that a
party is not ‘treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided
by another information content provider’ unless liability is premised
primarily on the actionable nature of that third-party content.”215 They also
propose “adding a provision to CDA 230 conferring immunity on providers
of online services capable of substantial nonactionable uses when two
conditions are satisfied: (1) liability is based on the design of the service;
and (2) the service cannot reasonably be designed to avoid liability while
retaining substantial nonactionable uses.”216 Lastly, they propose ensuring
that “[s]econdary liability provisions based on a defendant’s contribution to,
facilitation of, or failure to monitor actionable user behavior would be
preempted and replaced by a contributory liability regime combining a
‘material contribution’ requirement with a ‘knew or should have known’
mental state”; immunizing online service providers “from substantive
inducement liability regimes, unless and until regulators redesigned or
reaffirmed their applicability” to online service providers; and applying these
rules “to both federal and state statutes and regulations.”217
Facebook’s advertising platform is an oft-cited example of a potential
pitfall of automated decision-making. Yet, as Ari Waldman contends in the
final essay of this section, widespread proliferation of AI risks undermining
principles of accountability across many different aspects of society.
Waldman notes that automated decision-making systems that rely on “‘big
data’–powered algorithms” and machine learning are just as likely to commit
error and hold biases as humans.218 As the previous authors to this issue have
demonstrated in their discussions of Google and Facebook, the lack of
transparency surrounding the technology magnifies these concerns.219
Whether these features should eliminate algorithmic decision-making
altogether as any source of authority is a reasonable question220 given that
automating decisions about commercial and societal products may
contravene the kinds of democratic safeguards that we cherish, most
particularly equality and fairness.221 Yet some scholars also suggest that
there are procedures that can curtail the biases so that that they no longer pose
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risks.222 Similarly, Waldman believes that society should impose mandates
that all automated decision-making entities, both governmental and private,
should obey.223
Waldman supports his argument by first setting out and criticizing the
parameters of algorithmic systems and why they are both so attractive as well
as dangerous in a society that values democracy.224 For example, while
automated decision-making systems have powerful predictive abilities based
on existing data,225 they can also make serious mistakes that can have real
world impact226 as well as draw into question the fairness of such systems.227
Likewise, the more accurate such systems become, the more complex and
vague they appear to those trying to decipher their biases228 or take back
control.229 These circumstances shift the decision-making power from
humans to technology230 and potentially undermine the legitimacy of law.231
Indeed, not only can algorithms inject racial, gender, and socioeconomic
biases into a culture232 but the biased data sets that feed them “can entrench
second-class citizenship for marginalized populations.”233
By reviewing existing proposals to limit algorithmic decision-making and
expand accountability, Waldman creates a substantive approach234 that
includes “impact assessments, source code transparency, explanations of
either the result or the logic behind it, and a human in the loop who can hear
someone’s appeal.”235 While these suggestions are appealing, however,
Waldman does not believe they can close the gaps “in the underlying social
and political system that not only lays the groundwork for algorithmic
decision-making but sees its proliferation, despite its biases, errors, and
harms, as a good thing.”236 In short, the efficiency aspect of algorithmic
decision-making can favor machines over humans237 and is therefore
“presumptively illegitimate until it can be shown to reflect more than just
neoliberal values of innovation and efficiency.”238
In particular, algorithmic decision-making can embolden engineers to
make policy decisions, therefore reinforcing their devotion to efficiency over
any concern regarding privacy or other community values.239 In turn, the
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tenets of neoliberalism240 show how accountability for the results of
algorithmic decision-making can be “recast as compliance,”241 an alteration
that not only invites corporate interests but threatens social standards.242
Waldman believes that, in order to make algorithmic systems fulfill basic
social values other than efficiency, regulators must independently evaluate
the “code of automated systems for noncompliance with values like equality,
nondiscrimination, dignity, privacy, and human rights”—an approach that
academic researchers have been successfully following.243 In addition, each
level of federal and state government “could enact legislation that expresses
the values society wants algorithmic decisions to reflect” and therefore
construct “socially conscious algorithmic decision-making systems.”244
Because “algorithmic decision-making is a product of the neoliberal
managerial project,”245 Waldman contends it needs strict oversight, most
particularly by regulators and “independent academic experts” who can
inspect the system code to ensure that it is abiding by our normative
principles.246 Those devices that fail to pass these kinds of independent tests
should not be released or used.247 As Waldman concludes, this type of
strategy has two research requirements: first, the use of sophisticated
research to create procedures “for interrogating decision-making code” and,
second, the application of legal policy research to best assemble a regulatory
body that can make certain that algorithmic decision-making systems
continue to reflect the values we cherish as a society.248
CONCLUSION
AI and robotics are fast-moving fields, with new developments happening
seemingly every day. Though no one knows exactly what the future holds
for these technologies, we hope this Symposium marks the beginning of an
ongoing discussion between the different professions. The onus is on us to
determine what we make of technology. Will it mark the beginning of a new
golden age for humanity or will it spiral us into a dystopian nightmare? Will
we be Tomorrowland or The Terminator?

240. According to Waldman, “Neoliberalism is a political philosophy that aims to replace
and undermine a political system based on social justice and social welfare with a regime that
is ‘characterized by private property rights, individual liberty, unencumbered markets, and
free trade.’” Id. at 625 (quoting David Harvey, Neoliberalism as Creative Destruction, 610
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 22, 22 (2007)).
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